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Abstract—Semiconductor supply chain is increasingly getting 
exposed to variety of security attacks such as Trojan insertion, 
cloning, counterfeiting, reverse engineering (RE) and piracy of 
Intellectual Property (IP) due to involvement of untrusted parties. 
Camouflaging of gates has been proposed to hide the functionality 
of gates. However, gate camouflaging is associated with significant 
area, power and delay overhead.  In this paper, we propose 
camouflaging of interconnects using multiplexers (muxes) to 
protect the IP. A transistor threshold voltage-defined pass 
transistor mux is proposed to prevent its reverse engineering since 
transistor threshold voltage is opaque to the adversary. The 
proposed mux with more than one input, hides the original 
connectivity of the net. The camouflaged design operates at 
nominal voltage and obeys conventional reliability limits. A small 
fraction of nets can be camouflaged to increase the RE effort 
extremely high while keeping the overhead low. We propose 
controllability, observability and random net selection strategy for 
camouflaging. Simulation results indicate 15-33% area, 25-44% 
delay and 14-29% power overhead when 5-15% nets are 
camouflaged using the proposed 2:1 mux. By increasing the mux 
size to 4:1, 8:1, and 16:1, the RE effort can be further improved 
with small area, delay, and power penalty. 
Keywords— Reverse Engineering, Camouflaging, Threshold-
defined Multiplexer. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Reverse Engineering (RE) of an Intellectual Property (IP) [1-
2] is a process of identifying its design, functionality, and 
structure. In the RE method, the adversary de-layers the IC, 
determines the gate functionalities and their connectivity 
information, and, reconstructs the netlist (Fig. 1). This 
technique has been originally used by industries with the 
mindset of gathering information on its competitors, to 
confirm the functionality of their own design, and to ensure 
the legitimacy of circuits from the piracy. However, the 
advanced adversaries can exploit this technique with an ill 
intention to steal and pirate a design to illegally sell in the 
black market. Split manufacturing [1] technique has been 
proposed to make the IC fabrication more secure and robust 
against RE while simultaneously alleviating the cost of 
owning a trusted foundry. Split manufacturing technique 
separately manufactures the front-end (transistors) in an 
untrusted foundry whereas the back-end (interconnect) is 
manufactured in trusted facility. This makes the RE and 
Trojan insertion more challenging for the adversary since the 
connectivity information is hidden in the untrusted foundry. 
Furthermore, since the front-end fabrication cost is higher 
than the back-end, the cost benefit of outsourcing the 
fabrication is still preserved without increasing the security 
risks. Although this technique is effective in preventing RE, 
it can be susceptible to yield loss during stacking due to via 
misalignment. Furthermore, it still requires trusted foundry 
and costly assembly process. 
Camouflaging of gates have been proposed [10-11] to 
affordably hide the logic functionality and make the RE 
economically non-profitable or extremely difficult. The 
primary objective of gate camouflaging is to hide the 
functionality of few chosen gates (since camouflaged gates 
are typically area, delay and power intensive) to increase RE 
effort of adversary while keeping power, performance and 
area overhead minimal. The camouflaged gates can assume 
functionalities such as AND, OR, XOR, etc. Although the 
exact gate functionality is hidden, the adversary can still 
create a partial netlist with other known gates and go through 
guess-and-validate process to RE the missing gate 
functionality. This is achieved by making a guess about the 
gate function, finding test patterns to confirm the guess, and 
then applying these patterns to both a partial netlist and a 
golden chip. If the outputs match, then the guess is correct; 
else the adversary guesses a new gate functionality and 
repeats the procedures. This process is shown in Fig. 2(a). The 
 
Fig. 1. Reverse engineering of IP: the chip is de-layered to identify the gate functionality and their connectivity which is used to 
reconstruct the schematic and netlist. The objective is to clone the design. 
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RE effort is also shown which involves the time needed to 
identify all camouflaged gate functionalities.   
It has previously been shown that careful camouflaging of 
~10-40% gates can increase the RE effort significantly [8]. 
Dummy contact [1-2], programmable standard cell [3], and 
filler cell [4] based camouflaging have been proposed in past 
for Integrated Circuit (IC). For sequential circuits, additional 
logic (black) states are introduced in the finite state machine 
[9], which allow the design to reach a valid state only using 
the correct key.  In combinational logic, XOR / XNOR gates 
are introduced to conceal the functionality [13-14]. A new 
gate camouflaging technique based on the transistor threshold 
voltage (VT) programmable switch that turns ON/OFF based 
on VT assertion is also proposed for camouflaging [12][18].  
In this paper, we introduce a novel interconnect camouflaging 
technique to hide the connectivity information between gates 
in contrary to the widespread gate camouflaging 
methodologies. This technique is conceptually similar to split 
manufacturing with two major distinctions: (i) the proposed 
interconnect camouflaging technique does not require the 
splitting of layers between trusted and untrusted foundry; and 
(ii) only few selected nets are camouflaged. By carefully 
selecting the nets based on the prioritized metrics (which will 
be later discussed), we can maximize the RE effort. It has 
been shown that threshold voltage could be reverse 
engineered by inspecting the transistor doping using Focused 
Ion Beam (FIB) and Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) 
[24], this process is expected to be very expensive. 
Furthermore, since ICs contain billions of transistors, 
identifying dopant levels of a fraction of transistors could be 
tedious. Therefore, the IP could still be protected from low-
cost optical RE.   
The proposed camouflaging technique is achieved by 
inserting muxes in the design as illustrated in Fig. 2(b) using 
a C17 circuit as an example (from ISCAS85 benchmark [21]). 
The original connection is shown in thick black lines whereas 
the dummy connection is shown in light grey (highlighted in 
dashed-circle). If the adversary does not know the multiplexer 
select signal, he will resort to brute-force method using trial-
and-error. This, in turn, will increase the RE effort. The RE 
effort could be further increased by adding more fake signals 
and using a N:1 mux. Since mux design is low-overhead in 
comparison to the gate camouflaging, the proposed 
interconnect camouflaging technique is light-weight while 
being effective.  
The disadvantage of the above method is the requirement of a 
select signal for muxes. To resolve this issue, we propose a 
novel multiplexer design based on transistor VT–defined 
switches proposed in [18]. This eliminates the need of select 
signal and leaves no layout trace for the adversary to RE. In 
the proposed mux, the selected (real) path will connect to the 
output through low VT transistors whereas the fake paths will 
be disconnected from the output using high VT transistors. As 
the transistors VT are implemented by changing channel 
doping concentration during the manufacturing process, this 
information is opaque to the adversary forcing him to resort 
to RE-intensive trial-and-error approach.  
Furthermore, VT modulation (mixing normal VT (NVT), high 
VT (HVT) and low VT (LVT) transistors in a circuit) is a well-
known technique that is extensively utilized [7-8] in 
semiconductor industries for the trade-off between power, 
performance and robustness. Therefore, the proposed 
methodology does not require any additional process steps 
and can be extended to N:1 mux to increase RE effort of the 
adversary.  
It is important to note that the proposed camouflaging is 
robust against de-camouflaging solution proposed in [25] 
since it does not involve camouflaging of gates. Instead we 
camouflage the net connections which requires a new de-
camouflaging methodology. Similar concept of VT-based 
camouflaging has been proposed in [12]. However, it 
proposes dynamic gates which differs from the proposed 
interconnect camouflaging technique.  We integrate the VT-
defined muxes in different ISCAS benchmarks to evaluate the 
 (a) (b)    
Fig. 2. (a) When a gate is camouflaged, the adversary extracts the partial netlist, guesses the missing gate functionality (“??”) and applies 
specific test pattern to match the output against actual chip to confirm the guess. The RE effort is the time invested by adversary to find 
appropriate test pattern and identify the camouflaged gate functionality; and, (b) the concept of interconnect camouflaging using mux. The 
real connection is shown using thick lines. The RE effort will involve guessing a connection and validating it by running test patterns.    
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Fig. 3 (a) VT programmable switch. HVT: OFF, LVT: ON. PMOS 
switch works similarly; and (b) cartoon of I-V curves of NVT, HVT 
and LV transistors. The ION and IOFF depends on the LVT and HVT 
values as well as on gate voltage biasing. 
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effectiveness of interconnect camouflaging. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first effort towards camouflaging the 
interconnects using VT-defined multiplexers. In particular, we 
make following contributions in this paper: 
 We propose an interconnect camouflaging technique for 
protection of IP. The proposed interconnect 
camouflaging is low-overhead compared to camouflaged 
gates and can potentially eliminate the need of split 
manufacturing. 
 We propose a VT defined 2:1 and N:1 (where N=4, 8 and 
16) mux to obfuscate the nets. The muxes are optimized 
for optimum area, delay and power overhead. 
 We propose interconnect selection procedure and 
analysis framework to quantify area, power and delay 
overheads, and estimate RE effort. 
 We conduct thorough analysis of the proposed gate at 
system level using interconnect selection algorithms and 
RE effort metrics.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we 
describe the design and analysis of the proposed VT-defined 
mux. Proposed interconnect obfuscation approach is 
presented in Section III. The metrics for camouflaging and 
simulation results are described in Section IV. Conclusions 
are drawn in Section V. 
II. THRESHOLD VOLTAGE DEFINED MULTIPLEXER 
In this section, we present the concept of VT-defined switch. 
This is followed by the proposed VT-defined mux and key 
design requirements. Next, we present the mux design space 
exploration to achieve desired robustness and performance.  
A. Threshold Voltage defined Switch 
We use the programmable switch proposed in [18] that turns 
ON/OFF based on VT asserted on it. In this work, the switch 
is optimized to suit the mux application. The switch is realized 
by using conventional NMOS and PMOS transistors with the 
gate biased at the mid-point between nominal NMOS and 
PMOS threshold voltages i.e., VSN= 0.5(VTN+VTP). Therefore, 
the switch conducts when low VT (LVT) is assigned during 
manufacturing. This is because VGS= 0.5(VTN+VTP) > LVT. 
The switch stops conducting when high VT (HVT) is assigned 
since VGS=0.5(VTN+VTP) < HVT. This is depicted in Fig. 3(a) 
for NMOS transistor. The cartoon of transistor I-V curves for 
NVT, LVT and HVT transistor is shown in Fig. 3(b). The ION 
and IOFF that can be obtained by assigning LVT and HVT is 
also shown. A good VT defined switch should offer high ON 
current and low OFF current. The gate voltage, HVT, LVT 
values and transistor sizes are tuned to maximize the ION/IOFF 
ratio. For NMOS-switch, higher HVT values and lower gate 
voltage is good for IOFF (leakage) whereas lower LVT and 
higher gate voltage is good for ION (performance). Vice-versa 
is true for PMOS-switch. The switch optimization in presence 
of these conflicting requirements is described in Section IIC. 
B. Multiplexer Design and Challenges 
The VT-defined switch [18] is optimized to suit the mux 
application. In the proposed mux, the real path contains LVT 
pass transistor and the fake paths contain HVT pass transistor 
(Fig. 4(a)). This eliminates the need of a mux select input as 
VT value inherently determines the input selection. Since an 
NMOS transistor cannot pass a strong input ‘1’, we 
incorporate a level restoring weak HVT PMOS transistor 
(highlighted with dashed-circle in Fig. 4(a)) to pull the NMOS 
pass transistor output to full-rail. The level restoring transistor 
helps full voltage swing of the degraded input and improves 
the low-to-high transition. Furthermore, it eliminates the 
static current from the output inverter. The sizing of this level 
restoring PMOS transistor is done carefully so that it does not 
contend with the mux inputs. The alternative design technique 
to avoid level restoring transistor is to use full transmission 
gates (with NMOS and PMOS in parallel as shown in Fig. 
4(b)). This method will allow both strong input ‘0’ and ‘1’ to 
be passed through the muxes, but incurs significant power, 
(a) (b)  (c)  
Fig. 4 (a) The proposed pass transistor NMOS-only based 2:1 mux; (b) the Transmission (TR) gate based 2:1 mux; and (c) attributes of the 
proposed N:1 mux for NMOS-only mux and TR-gate mux 
(a)  (b)  (c)  (d)  
Fig. 5. Selection of VSN and offset from NVT: (a) 8:1 mux delay and leakage vs offset; (b) 8:1 mux delay vs VSN; (c) 16:1 mux delay vs 
offset; and, (d) 16:1 mux leakage vs offset. The optimal choice of offset is also shown by dashed lines. 
 
 
 
 
delay, and size overhead due to requirement of large PMOS 
transistors. As Fig. 4(c) shows the comparison result, 
transmission gate design increases area and power overhead 
especially for wide input mux designs. The pass transistor 
NMOS-only mux logic allows the proposed design to be 
compact without incurring significant overhead. The 2:1 
NMOS mux is comparable to 2-input minimum sized NAND 
gate in terms of delay. 
C. Design Space Exploration 
For the design space exploration, we have used Nangate 45nm 
technology [19]. The LVT and HVT values are chosen by 
determining their offset (Δ in Fig. 3(a)) from NVT value. For 
example, if the NVT of NMOS transistor is 0.62V, an offset 
of 0.1V (i.e., Δ = 0.1V) means that the LVT is 0.52V and HVT 
is 0.72V. For simulations, we have used 8:1 mux and 16:1 
mux circuit. We sweep both offset and gate voltages (VSN) 
and calculate the delay and leakage power. The offset voltage 
(Δ) is swept from 0.30V to 0.45V in steps of 0.05V for NMOS 
as well as PMOS. The switch gate voltage VSN is swept from 
0.1V to 0.5V in steps of 0.05V. Fig. 5(a) shows the delay and 
leakage power values with offset and Fig. 5(b) shows the 
delay when VSN are varied. From these two plots, we choose 
the optimum values of Δ (= 0.35V), and VSN (=0.7V) which 
are used for simulating 2:1, 4:1, 8:1, and 16:1 muxes. A 
similar trade-off study is conducted between the delay and 
leakage power for 16:1 mux (Fig. 5(c)-(d)).  
It is noteworthy that LVT and HVT in a process technology 
is optimized based on factors such as, leakage and 
performance of combinational logic. Therefore, it is likely 
that the proposed camouflaging will end up using the pre-
defined HVT and LVT values. However, if the optimization 
option is made available to the camouflaging designer, then 
security could be factored in along with leakage and 
performance to decide the optimal values of HVT and LVT 
as described in this Section. Note that VSP is not shown in the 
exploration since we are not using VT-defined PMOS 
transistor in the proposed mux. 
III. THRESHOLD-DEFINED CAMOUFLAGING 
METHODOLOGY 
In this section, we present methodology to identify 
interconnects that can be obfuscated using VT-defined 
multiplexers. 
A. Selection of Qualified Nets 
To maximize the RE effort, it is critical to camouflage the nets 
that cannot be reverse engineered through simple intuition. 
For example, if net N1 (which is a single fan-out net) in Fig. 
6(a) is camouflaged using a mux as shown in Fig. 6(b), then 
reverse engineering becomes straightforward. This is true 
since N1 cannot float in a valid design. This leaves the 
adversary to conclude that N1 and N2 are connected without 
running any simulation. We discard such single fan-out nets 
from the selection algorithm. In contrary, if a multi-fan-outs 
net such as N2 is selected for mux insertion, then the 
adversary cannot figure out the connection between N2 and 
N3 (Fig. 6(c)). Such nets are considered qualified nets in the 
proposed camouflaging procedure.  
B. Net Selection Methodology 
The design objective is to identify interconnects based on 
quantifiable values to maximize RE effort. We first compute 
the controllability (CC) and observability (Obs) values for 
every net and its number of fan-outs in a circuit. The ‘0’ and 
‘1’ controllability (CC0 and CC1) and observability values 
provides a relative difficulty of controlling and observing a 
logic signal of a particular net. By selecting the net with low 
(a)     (b)      (c)    
Fig. 6. Example of qualified nets selection: (a) original circuit; (b) single-fan-out net which is selected for mux insertion. Since N1 cannot 
float, the adversary can easily guess that N1 connects to N3. We disqualify such nets to prevent mux insertion; and (c) multi-fan-out net N2 
is selected for mux insertion. The adversary cannot figure the connection between N2 and N3. Such nets are qualified to enable selection.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Pseudocode of the net selection methodology 
 
 
CC0, CC1 and Obs values, it is possible to increase the RE 
effort of adversaries. Note that the controllability and 
observability of the net is assigned the same value as the 
controllability and observability of the gate that is driving the 
net. For the nets with fan-outs, the controllability and 
observability is propagated to all fan-out nets.  
Fig. 7 displays the proposed gate selection heuristic which is 
implemented in C++ and tested using HSPICE simulation. 
The heuristic imports Verilog benchmarks and finds 
controllability / observability values of the gates (step 2) and 
then assigns these values to the output nets and their fan-outs 
(step 3). The number of fan-outs of the nets is also calculated 
and assigned to the corresponding parent nets (step 4). Upon 
obtaining these parameters, we sort the output nets in 
descending order based on CC0+CC1+Obs value (step 5). We 
prioritize the number of fan-outs over the CC / Obs values 
since the higher number of fan-outs increases a circuit’s RE 
effort. When nets are sorted, we select dummy / fake nets 
based on the priority of CC0, CC1, Obs, and fan-outs 
parameters (step 6). By selecting the fake nets that are 
difficult to control and observe, we can further improve RE 
effort. Afterwards, muxes are inserted in top x% (where x is 
target percentage of nets that needs to be camouflaged) of the 
nets (step 7). Upon finishing the mux insertion, new 
camouflaged netlist is generated (step 8). This netlist is used 
as an input for the Synopsys Design Compiler to perform 
synthesis and to evaluate the overall design in terms of area 
overhead, propagation delay, and power consumption 
compared with the original ISCAS85 benchmarks.  
In addition to the above technique, we also select nets 
randomly for camouflaging. The fake nets are also randomly 
selected and the RE effort and overheads are compared with 
respect to the controllability/observability based selection 
methodology.  
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS 
In this section, we evaluate the design overhead using 
Synopsis Design Compiler for ISCAS85 benchmarks [21]. 
Since VT-defined muxes are not included in standard cell 
library, we have created a liberty file of the proposed muxes 
with values characterized using HSPICE simulation. 
Fig. 8(a-c) shows area, delay, and power of benchmarks 
replaced with 2:1 muxes for 5%, 10% and 15% camouflaging 
using the controllability/observability based net selection 
methodology. Compared to the original (“No Mux”) design, 
the average overhead is found to be 15% (area), 25% (delay) 
and 14% (power) for 5% camouflaging. The values for 10% 
 
Fig. 8. Area, delay, power values of different benchmarks based 
on the percentage replacements (5 to 15%) of nets by 2-1 mux; 
(a) area; (b) delay; and (c) power of net selection methodology. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Area, delay, power values of different benchmarks based 
on the percentage replacements (5%) of nets by 4-1 mux; (a) area; 
(b) delay; and (c) power of net selection methodology. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Area, delay, power values of different benchmarks based 
on the percentage replacements (5%) of nets by 8-1 mux; (a) area; 
(b) delay; and (c) power of net selection methodology. 
 
 
Fig. 11. Area, delay, power values of different benchmarks based 
on the percentage replacements (5%) of nets by 16-1 mux; (a) 
area; (b) delay; and (c) power of net selection methodology. 
 
(a)  (b) (c)  
Fig. 12. 2:1 Mux RE effort based on the % camouflaging: (a) based on random selection of nets; (b) based on controllability and 
observability of nets; and (c) comparison for different types of muxes for 5/10/15% camouflaging on c7552 benchmark. 
 
camouflaging are 26%, 41% and 22%. For 15% 
camouflaging, the values are 33%, 44% and 29%. From these 
results, we can observe the linear relation of overhead with 
respect to the number of camouflaged nets. To further 
increase the RE effort (discussed next) and to test the 
flexibility of our proposed mux, we also tested wider i.e., 4:1, 
8:1 and 16:1muxes. For these simulations, we only replaced 
5% of the nets. Fig. 9(a-c), 10(a-c), and 11(a-c) shows area, 
delay, and power values of benchmarks. The result of these 
overhead is shown in Table- 1. From this, we can conclude 
that wider input muxes can incur affordable increase in design 
overhead.  
We compute RE effort using commercial Automatic Test 
Pattern Generator (ATPG) as described in [23]. It employs 
Tetramax ATPG to generate test pattern in order to validate a 
conjecture about the camouflaged gate. In this work, we 
employ the same methodology to identify the mux selection. 
The RE effort is the time taken to set the inputs of the mux to 
desired values and time taken to propogate the mux output to 
a primary output (RE effort=Tsetting +Tpropogation). Each input of 
the mux has two possible logic (either 1 or 0). For the 2:1 mux 
we can have two input patterns 2’b10 and 2’b 01 for inputs I0 
and I1. We propogate the output to primary output in both 
cases. If a logic 1 (0) is propagated to the primary output for 
input pattern 2’b10 then we conclude that input I0 (I1) is 
selected path. The RE effort includes the time needed by the 
adversary to validate the guess regarding the mux selection. 
The ATPG time is determined by executing it on Scientific 
Linux 6.5 carbon with AMD operton processor (2GHz clock 
and 32GB RAM). A clock frequency of 1GHz (1ns cycle 
time) is assumed for each combination of gate-level test 
pattern generation/application.  
Fig. 12(a-b) shows the RE effort for different benchmarks for 
2:1 mux using random selection and controllability/ 
observability based selection. It can be observed that 
controllability/observability based mux insertion is more 
effective in increasing the RE effort. Fig 12(c) shows the RE 
effort for different types of muxes for 5/10/15% camouflaging 
in c7552 benchmark. It can be clearly observed that 4:1, 8:1 
and 16:1 mux could be more effective in increasing the RE 
effort compared to 2:1 mux while camouflaging same number 
of nets. This is primarily due to addition of more fake signals 
in the mux. Since wider mux insertion in logic incurs delay 
overhead, our next step is to minimize the overhead by 
targeting off-critical paths. We also intend to experiment with 
larger benchmarks to validate the effectiveness of 
interconnect camouflaging in practical circuits. It can be 
noted that the overheads (area, delay and power) as well as 
RE effort of the proposed interconnect camouflaging is 
significantly better than gate camouflaging technique [23]. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
We proposed threshold voltage-defined pass transistor based 
multiplexer to camouflage the interconnects of IPs both 
logically and physically. Compared to existing split 
manufacturing, the proposed interconnect camouflaging does 
not require any process change and does not incur extra 
assembly cost while increasing the RE effort. Careful 
selection of nets for camouflaging mitigates the overhead 
compared to gate camouflaging technique.  
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